DISCURSIVE RISKS: What are the epistemic assumptions of the analyst of collaboration?

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James Adams's picture
August 16, 2018

Star and Griesemer do make explicit the fact that they are presenting and analyzing a case where the collaboration was notably successful. They also make sure to note that boundary objects are simply one means of facilitating collaboration. Others are less voluntary. “The production of boundary objects is one means of satisfying these potentially conflicting sets of concerns. Other means include imperialist imposition of representations, coercion, silencing and fragmentation” (Star and Griesemer 1989, 413). In footnote 66, they acknowledge that they were made aware of this discursive gap/risk by an external reviewer: “We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to the limits of the cooperation model, and the importance of conflict and authority in science-making.”

 

Based on this acknowledgement, however, I am not sure that the authors have paid enough attention to the degree that these elements of conflict are present in the situation they describe, even if they are attenuated to be made more tolerable. Likewise, I am still wondering if these scholars are arguing that boundary objects are the only “voluntary-ish” means of establishing collaboration/cooperation across social worlds. And if they are, whether or not they are being too hasty.

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